Key themes

Scientific and technical advice (Chapter 9)

SAGE provided high-quality scientific advice at extreme pace throughout the pandemic, but some aspects of its operation were strained by the breadth and duration of the response. There was no systematic process in place to ensure that it provided sufficient breadth of scientific expertise: participants were recruited through existing networks and professional connections, relying on people who were able to free up time from their normal jobs. Initially, there was also no clear process for the devolved administrations to gain access to SAGE discussions and advice. As the pandemic progressed, the devolved administrations used their own existing advisory scientific committees or set them up. These fed information into SAGE while applying their advice to their own local circumstances.

The effectiveness of SAGE’s advice was also constrained by the limited information provided by the UK government on its overall objectives when advice was commissioned, which made it harder for SAGE to place its advice in the right context. This lack of clearly stated objectives contributed to the conservatism of SAGE’s advice in early 2020, with participants not believing that lockdowns would be a palatable policy response and, therefore, not modelling its implications until mid-March 2020.

More significant concerns were raised about the quality of economic modelling during the pandemic. Although structures for providing economic advice were set up in Wales and Scotland, there was little evidence in each of the four nations of substantive economic modelling and analysis being provided to decision-makers. This inevitably hampered the ability of decision-makers to assess and balance relative harms.

The process for providing advice on the economic and social implications of decisions was also much more opaque than that for scientific advice. The lack of transparency of this economic and social advice, together with the repeated use of ‘following the science’ and similar phrases in communications to the public, gave a misleading impression that decisions were being taken solely on the basis of advice from SAGE. This impression may have contributed to the wholly unacceptable hostility, threats and abuse to which some experts were subject. The Inquiry strongly condemns such behaviour.

Vulnerabilities and inequalities (Chapter 10)

Although the pandemic affected everyone in the UK, the impact was not shared equally. Older people, disabled people and some ethnic minority groups faced a higher risk of dying from Covid-19. For example, when taking into account age, people from a Black African and Black Caribbean background had the highest rates of mortality during the first wave of the pandemic. From the second wave onwards, the highest mortality rates were among people of an Asian or Asian British background. The increased risk of harm was also strongly influenced by socio-economic factors, with people living in overcrowded housing or working in low-paid employment at higher risk. This often overlapped with other factors such as ethnicity.

Vulnerable groups were also affected by the restrictions introduced to control the virus. The vast majority of children were not at risk of serious direct harm from Covid-19, but suffered greatly from the closure of schools and requirement to stay at home, and the consequent loss of interaction with friends and family and limited access to play. Children were not always prioritised. No government in the UK was adequately prepared for the sudden and enormous task of educating most children in their homes and failed sufficiently to consider the consequences of school closures for children’s education and physical and mental health. Module 8 is examining these issues in more detail.

Despite this harm being foreseeable, the impact on vulnerable groups had not been adequately considered in pandemic planning, and the existing mechanisms for assessing the impact of decisions were largely applied retrospectively. Decision-makers consequently had little understanding of the impact of restrictions on vulnerable groups.

Government decision-making (Chapter 11)

COBR is designed to deal with acute emergencies and proved inadequate for responding to a prolonged pandemic. While the COBR mechanism is appropriate for assessing the initial UK-wide response to an emergency, a clearer plan for how each government will make key decisions in a prolonged emergency is needed.

The UK Cabinet was largely sidelined in decision-making, albeit that as the pandemic progressed the coordination of advice and decision-making improved and became more formalised through the Covid-19 Strategy Committee (Covid-S) and Covid-19 Operations Committee (Covid-O) and the supporting Covid-19 Taskforce. Mr Johnson’s hospitalisation in April 2020 also exposed the lack of formal arrangements for covering the absence of a Prime Minister.

Decision-making authority in the Scottish Government rested with a small group of ministers throughout the pandemic. Although the First Minister of Scotland, Nicola Sturgeon MSP, was a serious and diligent leader who took responsibility for decisions, that also meant that ministers and advisers were often excluded from decision-making. The use of the informal Gold Command meeting structure diminished the role of the Scottish Cabinet, which frequently became a decision-ratifying body and not the ultimate decision-making body.

By contrast, the Welsh Cabinet was fully engaged throughout the pandemic, with decisions mostly being made through consensus. Mr Drakeford was recognised by his ministers as a careful and considered leader. He maintained positive relationships throughout the response.

The power-sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland are designed to ensure that each department has a significant degree of operational independence and individual ministers are afforded significant autonomy. This weakened the ability of the Northern Ireland Executive to coordinate the pandemic response and there was no one sufficiently empowered to hold departments to account. The Department of Health (Northern Ireland), which was the lead government department with responsibility for the response at the outset of the pandemic, largely operated in a silo – especially in the early stages of the response. The Northern Ireland Executive had only recently re-formed in January 2020, following a three-year period during which power-sharing was suspended, and it is unclear how decisions usually subject to ministerial approval would have been made in Northern Ireland had power-sharing still been suspended when lockdown decisions were taken.

The distinct power-sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland offered the opportunity to demonstrate that decisions were being made by all parties collectively for the greater good. Instead, however, on multiple occasions decision-making was marred by political disputes between Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin ministers. The attendance of the deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland, Michelle O’Neill MLA, at the funeral of Bobby Storey in June 2020, and her initial refusal to apologise for this, contributed to tensions in the Northern Ireland Executive Committee. The four-day Executive Committee meeting from 9 to 12 November 2020 represented a low point in Northern Ireland politics during the pandemic. The confidentiality of discussions was undermined by leaks and there was inappropriate instigation of cross-community votes to make political points by the First Minister of Northern Ireland, Arlene Foster MLA (later Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee).

The pandemic response also exposed wider cultural issues. The very least the public should be entitled to expect is that those making the rules will abide by them. Instances where ministers and advisers appeared to break Covid-19 rules caused huge distress to the public. This was especially the case for people who had endured huge personal costs to stick to the rules, with many bereaved people unable to be with their loved ones when they died. Instances where rule-breaking was not swiftly addressed also undermined public confidence and increased the risk of people not complying with the rules designed to protect them.

Decision-making was particularly affected by cultural problems in the UK government and Northern Ireland Executive. There was a toxic and chaotic culture at the centre of the UK government during the pandemic, with the Inquiry hearing evidence about the destabilising behaviour of a number of individuals – including Dominic Cummings, an adviser to the Prime Minister. By failing to tackle this chaotic culture – and, at times, actively encouraging it – Mr Johnson reinforced a culture in which the loudest voices prevailed and the views of other colleagues, particularly women, often went ignored, to the detriment of good decision-making.

Public health communications (Chapter 12)

Communication with the public is a critical aspect of a pandemic response, since controlling the virus is dependent on members of the public understanding the risk they face and acting accordingly. The ‘Stay Home’ communications campaign was effective at maximising compliance with the first lockdown, at a time when this was the understandable priority. However, the simplicity of the message meant that the intended nuances in the regulations were poorly understood, with the focus on ‘protecting the NHS’ potentially discouraging people from seeking medical treatment for non-Covid-19 conditions or from seeking help when they needed it. The balance between simplicity and detail became increasingly difficult to strike as the regulations and guidance became more complex. The introduction of localised restrictions made it difficult for members of the public to understand what rules applied to them in different places and situations, and their confusion was compounded by variations in rules across the four nations.

In focusing on how to get messages across to the whole population, the needs of vulnerable groups were sometimes lost. In particular, the UK government and Northern Ireland Executive initially failed to provide British Sign Language interpretation for press conferences or to provide key guidance in alternative formats. These are not secondary considerations. Everyone should be able to understand the action their government is asking them to take, and improvements made later in the pandemic serve to highlight the difference that proper and timely consideration of accessibility issues can make.

Legislation and enforcement (Chapter 13)

The legal response to the pandemic laid bare the limits of the UK’s legislative framework and the practical consequences of devolution. Faced with a public health crisis, the UK government relied on older public health legislation and bespoke emergency laws, rather than the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. While this enabled rapid action, it came at the cost of fragmented decision-making, reduced parliamentary scrutiny and caused public confusion.

Ministers relied on secondary legislation to implement many of the most far-reaching restrictions in modern UK history, with little or no parliamentary oversight. Across all four nations, ministers routinely used a procedure allowing laws to come into effect before they had been approved by the legislatures. While this approach was understandable in the earliest days of the pandemic, the approach continued throughout the pandemic, even when there was ample time for parliamentary scrutiny. This weakened democratic safeguards – the use of emergency regulations must be subject to greater scrutiny in future emergencies.

Frequent, complex changes to the law fuelled confusion, misunderstanding and – at times – incorrect enforcement. Police were asked to enforce unclear, shifting regulations, often issued at the last minute with little guidance. Fixed penalty notices were issued inconsistently across the UK. In England and Wales, some individuals faced £10,000 fines; in Scotland, most fines were just £60. Disproportionate impacts on certain groups were evident, especially in England, Scotland and Wales. In some cases, enforcement was practically impossible or legally uncertain – as seen in Northern Ireland during the controversy over the size of crowds at the funeral of Bobby Storey.

Time and again, public messaging failed to reflect the actual laws in place. Ministers made statements suggesting legal obligations where none existed, or vice versa. The public – and even the police – struggled to distinguish between government advice and binding legal restrictions, and there was no single, easily accessible source that clearly laid out the rules applying in each area. The resulting confusion undermined trust and compliance, particularly as legal rules diverged across the UK.

Intergovernmental working (Chapter 14)

A lack of trust between the Prime Minister and First Ministers of the devolved nations coloured the approach to involving the devolved administrations in UK government decision-making throughout the pandemic. Although the devolved administrations were invited to COBR meetings, they perceived that the decisions had already been effectively made beforehand by the UK government. COBR meetings were largely discontinued after May 2020 and intergovernmental discussions were thereafter led by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for the Cabinet Office – Michael Gove MP (later Lord Gove). The devolved administrations had a positive view of Mr Gove and felt that he was genuine in his efforts to understand their perspectives, but ultimately these meetings were limited in what they could practically achieve without Mr Johnson in attendance. Clearer structures for intergovernmental relations during an emergency, led collectively by the Prime Minister, First Ministers and deputy First Ministers, are necessary to facilitate better informed decision-making across the four nations.

Devolution has been a feature of the UK’s constitutional arrangements for over 25 years and the public is used to the devolved administrations taking different decisions from the UK government. An effective, four-nations response to a pandemic should be capable of accommodating differences in response between the nations, and it is incumbent on politicians to work collectively in the public interest in any future emergency.